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What Use Is Instrumentalism? 




This article summarizes four archetypal responses—the reactionary, conserva-
tive, pragmatist, and presentist—to the real or perceived threat to liberal learning 
in higher education. I advocate a balance between the conservative and the prag-
matist responses. A conservative pragmatist response resists the canonical rigid-
ity of the reactionary; responds to the ever-evolving social demands and practices 
that help frame the perennial questions of liberal learning, but values the poetry 
of conversation and the disengagement demanded by such a conversation, even if 
social problems initiate the reflective inquiry. The conservative pragmatist response 
highlights the perennial and the evolutionary, the universal and the particular, and 
the end in itself and the instrumental in liberal arts education.
Introduction
The utilitarian and consumerist model of higher education undervalues the impor-
tance and worth of the liberal arts in higher education, both globally and locally. 
Globally speaking, it does not take long to flip through a national newspaper or 
to click through the Chronicle of Higher Education to find either some call for the 
academy to train students for the current set of jobs available, especially for which 
there is high demand, low supply, and a national need, or critical responses to 
such a call. Andy Delbanco wrote in The Chronicle Review (2009) of the problem, 
citing our “need to respond to the public demand for some demonstrable utility 
in what we teach: literature, history, philosophy, the arts.”1 How many of us have 
received an article in our inboxes or mailboxes from a colleague or department chair 
that equips us with the bullet points of a departmental defense against the attack that 
our discipline has no utility in the real world of jobs, including charts showing how 
much money liberal arts majors make or how well they score on the GRE or LSAT?2 
Locally, my university recently grouped all of the liberal arts into something 
called “behavioral analytics,” where historians, philosophers, and English professors 
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were charged with writing grants over issues, including cyber security, that strike 
those of us in the humanities as dangerously presentist, scientistic, and vocational. 
Next, the topic for a faculty workshop was “From classroom to careers: Best prac-
tices in helping students articulate liberal arts skill sets and value their educational 
experiences.” Skeptics bristled at the title, “from classroom to careers,” even before 
reading the postcolon subtitle. Many of us suspect that there is a hidden premise 
embedded in this topic—we, as liberal arts faculty, have a job to do: prepare stu-
dents for careers. Put less charitably, liberal arts education is, at best, job prepara-
tion, at worst, job training. I think this is wrong, and the liberal arts must respond 
thoughtfully to the reduction of liberal learning to job training.
The message seems to be that the liberal arts are under attack from STEM. 
The vocational, professional margins of the academy have eroded its center. At 
worst, we fear administrators aiming to fold sociology into social work, econom-
ics into business, and make philosophy and political science pre-law functionaries. 
Eleonora Belfiore argues that such rhetoric of gloom and the rhetoric of “impact” 
go hand-in-hand. As “impact” discourse grows, so does gloom. And as the crisis in 
the humanities feels more acute, the impact of the humanities becomes a defense 
strategy.3 If there is an actual call for vocational education at the academy, (and it is 
not a creature of our own paranoia or self-doubt), and if the grant money flows not 
our way, but to those who contribute something to cyber security, we must survey 
the available responses to this cultural push for the liberal arts to become vocational. 
The question driving this inquiry is: what utility is there in demonstrating 
the utility of the liberal arts? In what follows, I will summarize four archetypal 
responses—the reactionary, the conservative, the pragmatist, and the presentist—
constructing a continuous spectrum of potential models. The two archetypes at 
the poles of the spectrum, the reactionary and the presentist, are less convincing 
than the two middle positions, conservative and pragmatist, which offer a bal-
ance between taking from the past and responding to the needs of the future. It 
must be admitted, then, that my conclusion is somewhat contained in the schema 
I deploy to investigate the problem, although I find valuable elements in each of 
the four models. That said, I will advocate a balance between the conservative and 
the pragmatist responses, one which continues to do what we do well, eschewing 
recourses to utilitarian justifications, one which refuses a rigid canonical fetish-
ism, but one which is responsive to student interests and needs within an evolving 
liberal arts curriculum. A conservative pragmatist response resists the canoni-
cal rigidity of the reactionary; responds to the ever-evolving social demands and 
practices that help frame the perennial questions of liberal learning, but values the 
poetry of conversation and the disengagement demanded by such a conversation, 
even if social problems initiate the reflective inquiry. Fusing the conservative and 
pragmatist responses highlights the perennial and the evolutionary, the universal 
and the particular, the end in itself and the instrumental in liberal arts education.
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Reactionary Responses
Many voices and symbols could be used as representative of a reactionary response to 
this vocational push in liberal arts education. Here I will illustrate three in an attempt 
to create a continuous spectrum from the reactionary to the conservative responses. 
First, Roger Kimball, editor of The New Criterion and author of many polemical attacks 
on the state of higher education, would respond to the question that is my title, “What 
Use is Instrumentalism?”, by answering “no use at all.” Education in the humanities is 
not for anything else, not a means to an end, and surely not a vocational end. 
Kimball is skeptical of the contemporary harelike rush to solve social problems 
and, at the same time, he laments the absence in western culture of the repudiation 
of the taboo.4 These two thoughts are two sides of a coin. To Kimball’s thinking, the 
thought that we can and should bring academic reflection and public policy to bear 
on, to his mind, such small social problems emerged contemporaneously alongside 
our historical path toward moral relativism. Over time, every cultural issue became 
relevant fodder for our reflection, could be theorized about, rationalized, historicized, 
placed in a social context, and given a social function. Every cultural form—video 
games, celebrity life, reality TV, advertisement—was put up for academic grabs. Once 
this sort of relativism of academic importance is achieved, then theories of fairness 
and justice could be brought to bear upon them, and radical academics—“tenured 
radicals,” as he calls them in one book title— could write in service of public poli-
cies whereby the smallest of social ills might be eradicated.5 
In the face of such relativism, Kimball laments the absence of our unreasoned 
repudiation of the taboo. To reject the taboo, according to Kimball, is to refuse to 
reflect on some forms of culture because they are taboo, outside the sphere of or 
not worthy of our rational reflection. Leo Strauss refers to these forms as “vulgar-
ity” and “mass culture.”6 Pornography, for instance, might have, in some golden 
age of moral stability, been considered taboo. But now we have Porn Studies, an 
academic journal dedicated to the cultural form of pornography. We, in the once 
exalted academy, now give genetic accounts of pornography, reflect on gender and 
racial stereotypes in pornography, and wax Marxist and Foucauldian on porn as 
a cultural form, and, as Kimball mourns, it “passes for humanistic research and 
scholarship.”7 We can give academic papers on why gaming culture marginalizes 
female gamers. We can expand the domains of justice and fairness from the big 
issues to the small, all in service of the radical political agenda of the far left. One 
of Kimball’s greatest enemies is the method of deconstruction in literary and art 
criticism, which he calls a “sham.” He is not alone in registering an attack on the 
humanities because of the predominance of postmodern French thought. The self-
image problem for the humanities is part of an attack on postmodern culture studies 
referred to as “intellectual gobbledygook” by Roger Scruton,8 “academic bullshit” 
by G.A. Cohen,9 and “pretentiously opaque and obscurantist,” by Terry Eagleton.10 
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This line of research in the humanities is also seen to be expressly politically left. 
The criticism is that this research does not offer debate, but only membership and 
indoctrination.11 The hallowed halls of liberal arts education, once the great curators 
of the best of the best, now read its own canon against itself deferring interpreta-
tion in unintelligible “prof-speak” under the supposition that artistic greatness is a 
mask covering white male privilege, repressed sexual impulses, or social hierarchy 
and classism. We have, as one of Kimball’s book titles states, “raped the masters.”12
Somehow, according to Kimball, the once great institution of higher educa-
tion became polluted and corroded by external forces. And new external forces lurk 
at the gates of the ivory tower—the need for more STEM education and job training 
in the academy. What is the archetypal reactionary response? Return to the canon. 
Curate the best of the best in our disciplines. And refuse some forms of culture 
and some calls to transform ourselves into job trainers, as, if not taboo, beneath us. 
Leo Strauss offers another reactionary posture to the current instrumental-
ism in defense of liberal education. His reasoning is as follows: Liberal education is 
literate education in or through letters; it is education in and toward culture.13 We 
need literate education as a necessary condition for democracy, whose ideal is that 
of a universal aristocracy of wise citizens.14 But this ideal is not currently possible, 
both because the idea of culture has become relative, and because of the prevalence 
of electoral apathy and “mass culture.” Liberal education must be the “counterpoi-
son” to the vulgarity of mass culture.15 To help serve as the antidote to mass culture, 
we must engage in a brave conversation with and between the “great books.”16 We 
must be courageously open to the possibility that our contemporary worldview is 
not superior to that of the great minds, and we must be bold enough to enter into a 
conversation with those great minds. Only in this way can we “break through the 
noise, the rush, the thoughtlessness” of mass culture.17 The remedy to the vulgar-
ity of mass culture renders us more humble and modest, but it is a bold venture.18
Strauss’s definition of liberal education shares with Kimball an implicit 
acceptance of the canon of great minds, but his image of a conversation is a wel-
comed step toward the conservative response discussed below. We should not 
only curate the canon, but be active in a dialogue with it, which suggests that our 
contemporary situation might inform the way we converse. However, if Strauss 
were to respond to the vocational pressure in liberal education or to the erosion 
of liberal education from STEM fields, it would be less responsive and more of a 
retreat to the great books of the historically accepted canon, and because of this 
retreat, it is reactionary. 
The third theorist helping fill out the archetype of the reactionary response 
to the current potential crisis in liberal education is Roger Scruton, who is clear 
that education is an end, and not a means.19 Only in a “bureaucratic state” could 
education be thought of to serve ends such as economic growth or unemployment 
reduction.20 Among the discourse of those viewing education instrumentally is 
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the ever-present reference to the “relevance” of education. Contemporary admin-
istrators often ask teachers to make what they teach relevant, a presentist demand. 
Educators need somehow to transform the irrelevant canon into something pres-
ently digestible by highlighting its connection to something the student, the grant 
funders, or the bureaucratic state finds currently significant.21
Scruton’s object of attack in light of the discourse of relevance is the “studies” 
degree. He draws a caricature of such a degree, “Football Studies.” In this course of 
study, a student learns the sociology of football, engages in a class analysis of foot-
ball culture, reads the psychology at work in the playing of football, and engages 
in “wetter” inquiries into football and the unconscious.22 While conceding that 
football studies might constitute a straw argument, Scuton registers his attack on 
women’s studies, gay studies/queer theory, sports studies, and media studies (and, I 
imagine, would extend it to environmental studies, poverty studies, Africana stud-
ies, and religious studies). Scruton likens the studies degrees to the study of holes, 
where one could articulate the common features of all sorts of holes, in shirts, in 
the earth, in black holes, and in key-holes.23
The problem is that these studies are, according to Scruton, not disciplin-
ary. These meta-degrees create “experts without knowledge,” and his most searing 
critique is of the degree in education and the creation of schools of education. This 
emphasis on education as a degree creates a mass of bureaucrats, “educationists,” who 
both offer no critical reflection on an identifiable field of study and are responsible 
for the relevance revolution, which he thinks is the problem in liberal education, not 
the solution.24 To the current vocational push in liberal education and the current 
demands that the liberal arts be potentially STEM-relevant, Scruton offers another 
reactionary response—an approving description of how conservatives reacted by 
advocating for more independent and private school education. His critique of 
meta-disciplines is an acclamation of traditional disciplinarity, which demands an 
identifiable field of study, which entails a canon of study, much like Kimball and 
Strauss. The reactionary response refuses to see liberal education as instrumental, 
and it retreats to the sanctuary of traditional disciplinarity and great books curricula. 
Conservative Responses 
If Kimball’s and Scruton’s polemical attacks on the state of higher education, at least 
in part, offend those in the liberal arts who stress the importance of humanistic 
reflections on race, gender, sexuality, and other issues of social justice, as well as those 
who are deconstructionist, Foucaudian, or Marxist in their theoretical approaches, 
then we need to move down the spectrum to a more moderate, albeit conservative, 
response to the prospect of an erosion of liberal arts education. Here I use the term 
conservative not as equivalent to anything politically right wing, but as a methodol-
ogy, and one best characterized as skepticism of rationalism. The conservative skeptic, 
for our purposes, is doubtful that any preconceived blueprint for practical activity, 
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from politics to education, is the most effective tool for undertaking practical endeav-
ors. Scruton’s self-image is certainly conservative in this way, and for this purpose 
he serves as a bridge from the reactionary to the conservative. However, Scruton’s 
version of conservatism, in education and in other cultural institutions, universal-
izes the conservative sentiments, takes them as first principles, and thus falls into the 
rationalist trap that suggests these principles could serve as a blueprint for education. 
The rational planner might suppose that a present survey of vocational needs 
in our country or region would provide the fixed end to which our education must 
serve as a means. Institutions external to our college—from the White House, to 
corporations, to grant-funding institutions—by having one finger on the pulse of 
the present survey of job needs and one on the pulse of education, are in a constant 
state of anxiety whenever the two pulses’ beats are out of sync. This anxiety is not 
new. As Timothy Fuller wrote, “Anxiety over the state of American education is 
inherent to the American Republic.”25 Throughout the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries, the debate took place between two camps. On one side are those critical 
of traditional liberal learning by virtue of the progress of science and the expansion 
of democracy. The tacit worldview of this pole is that the human condition is an 
endless readjustment toward perfection, the endless quest for techniques to improve 
our health, welfare, and social equality. Education, for this side of the debate, must 
serve present and future ends. On the other side are those who view education, as 
Kimball and Strauss do, as the learning of the perennial truths found in the West-
ern canon of great books, which requires a disengaged and utterly noninstrumental 
attitude. The new does not supersede the old, which must be preserved, curated, 
and engaged in a humbling conversation.
The English philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, represents the archetypal con-
servative response. But Oakeshott rejected the dichotomy between the traditional-
ists and the progressives. He was a thoroughgoing skeptic of rationalism in practical 
activity, and he wanted to preserve in education the disengaged interval in learning 
where students ask questions about their own existence, purpose, and meaning. 
In such a disengaged interval, they can survey the great thinkers who posed such 
questions and reflect on the vast array of offerings to find meaning in their pur-
suits. But as a deeply historical thinker, Oakeshott understood that any answer to 
these perennial questions could not constitute universal truth. Each of us, based on 
our unique, particular situation, must continually ask these questions as they are 
articulated in novel ways based on the dynamics of social and historical evolution.
Oakeshott describes the politics of rationalism as one which assumes the 
character of an engineer, whose purpose in forwarding educational policy is 
the solving of problems. This type of political engineer uses the tool of “reason” 
to surmount a series of crises whose only character is the failure to satisfy the 
felt needs of the moment, such as the need for vocationally trained students. 
The circumstances of society’s problems, from unemployment to a dearth of STEM- 
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educated graduates, provide the crises, but the circumstances themselves never aid 
in the solution. Rationalist educational policy planning is a politics of perfection 
and uniformity.26 By rejecting the particular circumstances as providing the tools to 
enable people to flourish in unique ways, rationalist politics has no place for variety 
and attempts to impose a “uniform condition of perfection upon human conduct.”27 
(The rationalist adores one-size-fits-all assessment plans, for instance.) The circum-
stances of our current crisis include the push toward STEM or the vocational tug 
at the soul of liberal learning, but our particular circumstances—for instance, the 
unique strengths of each department or college—do not provide the tools toward 
a resolution, according to the rationalist model of which Oakeshott is so skeptical. 
Oakeshott claims that the rationalist reduces technical and practical knowl-
edge, both of which are involved in most human activities, to the technical and 
claims that practical, traditional knowledge is no knowledge at all. The reason 
for this is that the rationalist is consumed by a quest for certainty.28 Perhaps the 
prevalence of rationalism in education accounts for our need to defend the liberal 
arts against the charge that they are unempirical, unrigorous, and “subjective.”29 
Another by-product of the rationalist scheme of practical activity is that it con-
verts habits and traditions of behavior, which are unconscious, built up over time, 
adaptable to circumstance, and never quite finished, into rigid systems of abstract 
ideas—ideologies. These ideologies serve as the plans for using technical knowledge 
to achieve present ends. The result is that “the life of society loses its rhythm and 
continuity and is resolved into a succession of problems and crises,” and “all sense 
of what Edmund Burke called the partnership between present and past is lost.”30 
Oakeshott would reject the current calls to conform to present needs, much as he 
would reject the demand that tests could be standardized for all. As another British 
philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead, wrote: “No system of external tests . . . can 
result in anything but educational waste.”31 He thought that no rigid curriculum, 
which is not modified by the individual teacher for the needs of particular students, 
should be permissible.32 The same can be said of pedagogical methods: simplifying 
teaching methods into “fail-safe” technical functions threatens to undermine the 
valued variability in teaching that would enable genuine learning.33 The experi-
mentalist and the rationalist pedagogues are very much at odds.
The confusion between the pressure groups calling for vocational education, 
such as the foundation and government grant-funding institutions and the actual 
educational institutions, the universities, ends in a change in focus from the quali-
ties we seek to foster to the techniques needed to serve present, vocational ends. 
Being self-aware of the qualities and so-called soft skills that are the by-product 
of, not the blueprint for, a traditional, liberal education would help us self-assess 
our success in teaching these, to some extent. W. E. B. Dubois referred to these as, 
“intelligence, broad sympathy, knowledge of the world that was and is, and of the 
relation of men to it,” always keeping in mind, following Aristotle, the difference 
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between “the means for living” and “the object of life.”34 Such broad sympathy 
is what Michael Bérubé had in mind when he characterized those educated in 
the humanities as “less inclined to pathologize disability, more sympathetic to the 
argument that many disabilities are disabling chiefly because our built environ-
ments and social policies make them so, more willing to revise my beliefs and my 
expectations every time my child [with Down syndrome] accomplishes something 
our doctors never imagined to be possible for him.”35
For Oakeshott, the debate over the content of liberal education was misguided 
and ended in a false dichotomy of pluralistic confusion and canonical dogmatism. 
Oakeshott’s primary metaphor in liberal education was that of a “conversation,” and, 
as with Alfred North Whitehead, an “adventure in ideas.” What qualities do we want 
our students to embody when they engage in such an adventurous conversation, and 
what romantic possibilities do we think such a conversation might disclose? In the 
end, such a conversation is emancipation, for Oakeshott. This archetype wants our 
students to be free, and job training, in contradistinction from conversation, is a 
limitation as much as it is a preparation. But, it must be said, the archetypal conser-
vative response to such pressure is a nonresponse: we must continue to keep doing 
what we do well. We need not limit the canon to a fixed list of universally accepted 
greats, and our role is not just curator, but facilitator of the conversation, which Oake-
shott (1962) said provides the “voice of poetry in the conversation of mankind.”36 
Recently, Michael Raposa has offered two images of the conservative ideal in 
liberal arts education. Two philosophers, Henry David Thoreau and Charles Sanders 
Peirce, help maintain continuity in the spectrum of responses to the present crisis. 
Raposa, moving us closer to a pragmatist response, writes that “Inquiries in the liberal 
arts ought never to be classified as having no practical purpose; rather, such inqui-
ries are distinguished by the fact that their purposes are multiple and indeterminate, 
and so cannot be readily specified in advance.”37 Raposa offers Thoreau’s activity of 
“sauntering” as representative of the type of inquiry in which the liberal arts engage.38 
Sauntering is not a mere walking from point A to B, but an endeavor in which pur-
poses emerge within the course of the activity. They are not predetermined as a blue-
print beforehand, but the activity is not entirely arbitrary either. Rather, a “subtle 
magnetism” in nature attracts one who saunters. The intellectual saunter is attuned 
to the features internal to its inquiry, which are generative of its own purposes.39 
Raposa analogizes this activity to “musement,” the form of meditative think-
ing highlighted by Peirce. This “pure play” of the mind, once again, is not arbitrary, 
but bound only by the purposes that emerge in the “communication between self 
and self.”40 While the rational planner offers purposes as a blueprint in education, 
both of these activities, sauntering and musement, offer a picture of a “developmen-
tal teleology,” where purposes emerge in the activity of inquiry, rather than being 
conceived prior to the inquiry and needlessly confining it. Raposa’s central claim 
is that these two images show us what the liberal arts do. If this is correct, then 
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printing syllabi with “learning outcomes” on them, as our rationalist administra-
tors demand, misunderstands the activity of liberal education, whose telos develops 
in the process of inquiry. Further, if the learning outcomes are tailored to present 
STEM or vocational needs, then the course of study in the liberal arts becomes 
detrimentally confined and thoroughly illiberal, in Oakeshott’s sense of liberation.
Pragmatist Responses
Offering Peirce as representative of the third conservative helps construct a con-
tinuous, not discrete, movement down the spectrum of responses, as he is one 
of the founders of American pragmatism. Fundamental to our understanding of 
the pragmatist response to external pressure is an understanding of a pragmatist 
theory of inquiry. The essential features of our existence and experience are both 
stable and precarious. In stable conditions we act out of habit, but when our habits 
are disrupted, our involved situation is pervaded by uncertainty, irritation, and 
precariousness. This is the indeterminate situation. Our first step in inquiry is to 
establish a problem, which involves the testing of hypotheses and the empirical 
work to determine their worth. The second step is to hypothesize a solution. Test-
ing solutions means more empirical work and experimentation until we resolve 
the problem at hand and return to our preferred state of equilibrium and habit.
I am doubtful that there was ever a habitual state of repose in liberal arts edu-
cation, but perhaps there have been phases lacking constant disruption and indeter-
minacy. Our current state seems more precarious, as we are repeatedly told to find 
grant money from institutions funding STEM or by the presentation of a topic whose 
premise is that we need to be job trainers. As Alasdair MacIntyre stated, “It is liberal 
education, not job training.”41 Nevertheless, we must establish the problem. This inquiry 
must be communal. Is the threat real or supposed? Is the premise as nefarious as the 
reactionary response would suggest? Are we really under attack, as some suppose? 
I think, given a problem, regardless of its scope, the pragmatist archetype—
John Dewey—has a response serving as a potential model. The historicist leaning 
of the tradition of American pragmatism would certainly point out that uni-
versities have always been a response to a social demand of some sort, whether 
the training of lawyers or clergy, or to knowledge production in the sciences, or the 
special place and time for students to participate in a disengaged conversation of 
humanistic learning. Our current historical situation suggests that there is a new 
social demand, and we must respond in some way to such a demand. The organ-
ism of the university must adapt to its environment, or it will not be fit for survival.
Dewey spent his career attempting to show the wrong-headedness of dichoto-
mies of all sorts—theory and practice, mind and body, fact and value, the school 
and society. The university and society are not distinct hermetically sealed enti-
ties, but are marked by continuous, fluid interactions. Asking how the college of 
liberal arts can work in an interactive way with the communities which surround 
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it, including the STEM community and an environment needing certain skills in 
various vocations, is a very live option for the pragmatist archetype. However, we 
need not merely prepare students for a fixed social end, to serve their community 
in a preconceived way, but rather to enable them to reconstruct imaginatively their 
communities and social institutions, proposing new ends and purposes. Those Kim-
ball denigrated as tenured radicals perhaps merely desire to habituate students into 
the skill of imaginative reconstruction, thinking of ways to remake the world anew 
instead of churning out vocationally prepared victims of the world’s present ills.
We need to balance responsiveness to novel social demands with resistance 
to the gesture that we churn out graduates prepared to fill a role in the status quo 
society. In order to do that, we must point out the values that underlie the calls for 
the humanities to defend themselves. The utility we are asked to defend is often 
equated with impact and value, but such an equation is already a premise founded 
on a particular set of values, largely those of economic growth and return on invest-
ment. The discourse of utility is interrelated with the discourse of “employability.”42 
The pragmatist is open to the role of contemporary social needs informing the study 
of liberal arts, but part of the study of liberal arts is the imaginative reconstruction 
of values, including the equation of the value of liberal learning with its market-
ability on the most proximate job market.
Another relevant binary to the pragmatist paradigm is that of the student and 
the curriculum. Dewey thought we needed to find the excluded middle between a 
curriculum that succumbed to the spontaneity of present student interests and one 
that imposed a rigid, teacher-centered curriculum upon the student. For Dewey, 
the student brings with her the experiences and needs from which the curriculum 
must emerge. In The Child and Curriculum, Dewey argued that the methods of edu-
cation focusing on the curriculum emphasized the rational, organized, expansive, 
and disciplined aspects of learning, while those focusing on the student emphasized 
the emotional, holistic, narrow, and self-interested aspects of learning.43 Dewey’s 
goal in these lectures was to show that the dichotomy was flawed from the start. 
Rather, the curriculum should be seen as a natural outcome of student interests 
and needs. We must begin with student interests, as the active precedes the passive 
in the student’s learning, but those interests contain the problems whose reasoned, 
disciplined, and organized inquiry must help her resolve. 
Dewey maintained that the process of inquiries of a practical sort is continu-
ous with those described as intellectual. However, while some practical inquiries 
endeavor only to return us to a state of habitual activity, others, such as those in 
education, attempt to foster further inquiry. Dewey summed this up by stating that 
“the aim of education is to enable individuals to continue their education—or that 
the object and reward of learning is continued capacity for growth.”44 The premise 
that liberal education should be job training makes the mistake of supposing that 
education ends when school ends. It forgets that graduation is a commencement, 
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and that a genuinely liberal education will enable the student not to fulfill one social 
need but to continue her growth and to adjust to her ever-evolving social situa-
tion.45 One of the criteria Dewey used to identify a good aim in education was that 
the aim must represent a freeing of activities. And Dewey thought that “the only 
freedom of enduring importance is freedom of intelligence.”46 Education must end 
in “a freedom which is power: power to frame purposes, to judge wisely, to evalu-
ate desires by the consequences which will result from acting upon them; power to 
select and order means to carry chosen ends into operation.”47 Framing purposes 
and directing actions by weighing the worth of their consequences are stages in 
the process of inquiry, which education must embody.
However, given that student interests and needs must provide the tools of the 
curriculum to some extent, and given that many students will be interested in and 
are in college—not for some romantic conversation with the history of humanity, but 
because they will need a job—how can we, as liberal arts educators, respond appro-
priately to those demands? Perhaps these needs could serve as constant denotative 
reference points in our teaching of skills: that cover letters and personal statements 
need to be well-written, or that successful personal statements require the reflec-
tion we value in liberal education. For instance, a student who has read Immanuel 
Kant understands the complexity behind the question “Who am I?” upon which she 
must reflect in a personal statement to a professional or graduate program. Access 
to oneself is, after Kant, indirect. Knowing this, at least, might give a student cause 
to proceed reflectively and critically, resisting the easy, simple, or uncritical answers 
and instead disclosing the nature of the question itself in her attempt to answer it. I 
think we need to inquire how to respond, not merely to a real or perceived external 
pressure, but to real and present student demands, to deliver on the need to help stu-
dents articulate their liberal arts skill set while valuing their educational experiences.
Presentist Responses
It is tempting to use Booker T. Washington as the archetypal apologist for vocational 
training and as representative of a presentist response to these external pressures. 
Washington advocated educating African American students in skilled labor at the 
Tuskegee Institute, and in so doing, represented, to some, acquiescence to present 
conditions of racial disenfranchisement and social segregation. Like our students who 
need jobs when they graduate, and unlike DuBois, Washington had to make a payroll, 
and this influenced his thinking to some degree. However, Bill Lawson actually char-
acterizes Washington’s response as pragmatist, not presentist. He wrote, “People need 
to view Washington as a pragmatist, in the John Dewey sense of pragmatism, when 
you’re really working to solve a significant problem.”48 Furthermore, I doubt many lib-
eral arts educators have anything against vocational education. Many of us would be 
advocates of increased funding to vo-tech schools, especially the types of educational 
programs that can be nimble enough to evolve quickly with changing social demands. 
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But the question for us is how much liberal arts education, however con-
ceived and articulated by us as its practitioners, should adjust to external pressures? 
Therefore, the archetypal presentist response for our purposes is the cyber security 
service model. We ask, where is there a need, and where is their grant money to be 
had? We then, as history professors, for instance, pause from archival research, our 
attempts to disclose the world historical importance of the French Revolution, or the 
pervasiveness of a Cartesian worldview, and find that thing in our discipline that 
could possibly address this pressing need for cyber security and write the grant our 
administrative overlords wanted in the first place. Despite the extreme archetype 
at this end of the spectrum, writing grants in areas of cyber security is a real, not 
just a straw, option for liberal arts educators. And, I think, despite the extremes at 
the edges of my spectrum, each of these four archetypal responses has its merits.
Conclusion
The question at the heart of my inquiry is: What utility is there in a utilitarian response 
to these real or perceived threats to liberal learning in higher education? The pragmatist 
and presentist responses are certainly more utilitarian. The reactionary and conserva-
tive responses are much less interested in demonstrating use-value and more secure 
in pressing on with the tasks of curating the great works of the traditional canon or 
carving out a space and an interval for students to disengage, saunter, and self-reflect 
in the pure play of musement. But the reactionary responses of Kimball, Strauss, and 
Scruton, in their fetishizing of the canon, are actually ahistorical in that they fail to 
see that the canon has always been contested and has always evolved, that universities 
have come in and out of fashion as the place where knowledge production takes place. 
By insisting that questions of race, gender, and poverty are too small to investigate, 
and by refusing to engage some pervasive cultural practices intellectually, Kimball’s 
model actually promotes the professionalism of which he is so critical. It is a profes-
sional risk to inquire into pornography and professionally safe to till the soil of the 
greats. Adding to the tomes of Plato scholarship seems more careerist than risking a 
publication in Porn Studies. The liberal mind is an open mind, and I think Strauss, in 
his fear of the vulgarity of mass culture, and Scruton, in his attacks on the “studies,” 
have blocked the path of inquiry that liberal education seeks to open. 
Oakeshott’s model seems much more attractive in several regards. First, it 
does not demand canonical rigidity in that it refuses to suppose that any particu-
lar articulation of the recurrent, reflective questions asked by the liberal arts could 
suffice as universal. As our social and historical particularities, each asks perennial 
questions from distinctive contexts and in novel and unique ways. Second, the model 
of conversation, rather than training, is a refusal to reduce practice to technique. By 
following the Socratic archetype of dialogical philosophical inquiry, it values the 
variability inherent in conversational approaches to reflective learning, much as 
Thoreau’s sauntering and Peirce’s musement involve the developmental teleology at 
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work in each. The conservative, as Oakeshott argues in his political writings, values 
pluralism in private life and in educational pursuits. While the rationalist politician 
favors a teleocratic regime and operates with a utopian politics of faith, the conser-
vative favors a nomocratic regime and operates with skepticism toward utopian and 
teleocratic blueprints for politics. The same holds for a conservative philosophy of 
education. The standardized test, the rubric, and predetermined student learning out-
comes treat the by-products of liberal learning as fixed goals to be applied universally 
as preconceived purposes. Ever-shifting social demands cannot provide the blueprint 
for such a rationalist model of education any more than Kimball’s rigid canon should.
However, Dewey’s pragmatist model adds to, without overturning, Oake-
shott’s response qua nonresponse. First, Dewey reminds us that establishing the 
problem is a significant step in inquiry. We need to do the empirical work of identi-
fying the problem before we rush to solve the problem lurking in any hidden prem-
ises. Second, Dewey emphasizes the transactive relationship between the university 
and the society, such that whatever disengaged interval the place of liberal learning 
represents, it does not represent an interval in a vacuum. Both the students and the 
faculty come to the place of learning from unique, involved situations and bring 
with them the qualities, interests, and problems such situations give rise to. The dis-
engaged, reflective learning that takes place also returns denotatively to the social 
situations outside the school. Moreover, the meaning and value of such reflections 
are found in the consequences of their social functions, regardless of whether or not 
the value can be quantitatively measured. Even if the value was measured accurately, 
the pragmatist, qua conservative, would not suppose that it should be universalized 
and imported to all liberal arts education without special attention to the unique 
qualities of each involved situation of learning. The increase in responsiveness by 
the pragmatist is not a turn to rationalist education, which promotes the teleocratic 
and utopian model that Oakeshott resisted. Rather, the responsiveness is to student 
interests and needs, which are the product of their transactive relationship to their 
social environments, and a response to the social problems which in part constitute 
the situatedness of the place of learning. The present job needs of a given epoch 
may even signal a problem demanding inquiries involving the liberal arts rather 
than providing the liberal arts with a fixed goal to be achieved instrumentally and 
unreflectively. The intellectual freedom Dewey promoted emphasized the framing 
of purposes, not the molding of oneself as means to achieve fixed ends.
A conservative pragmatist response resists the canonical rigidity of the reac-
tionary, responds to the ever-evolving social demands and practices that help frame 
the perennial questions of liberal learning, but values the poetry of conversation 
and the disengagement demanded by such a conversation, even if social problems 
or student interests initiate the reflective inquiry. Fusing the conservative and 
pragmatist responses highlights the perennial and the evolutionary, the universal 
and the particular, the end in itself and the instrumental in liberal arts education. 
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